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The "Technology Gap" and National Science Policy*

Richard R. Nelson
Yale University and the RAND Corporation

During the last decade the notion of "technologi cal gap" between the

United States and Europe has played an important role, on both si~es of
the Atlantic, in thinking about pl1licy regarding ·science and technology.
Europeans have pointed with alarm to the alleged gap, have credited (or

blamed) the gap on massive support of "big science and technology" by the
United States government, and have proposed that the remedy is for
European governments to do likewise.

At the same time various aspects

of American policy have been rationalize d by arguments that they are
"necessary if the United States is not to lose its technologic al lead.

Yet

the very concept of a "technologi cal gap" is a somewhat slippery:.on e;
many people have argued that there is no such thingo

And certainly the

connection between the existence or non-existen ce of a gap and specific

science policies is far from obvious.
In this paper I will argue three points.

First, the technologic al

gap is a meaningful concept, and the phenomenon probably is real.

Seco_lld•

it is nothing new; something like a technologic al gap between the United

*This paper is based partically on research undertaken under the

sponsonhip of the Twentief.li Century Fund and the Agnelli Foundation.

States and Europe has existed for upwards of one hundred years.

Third,

keying science and technology policy to "eliminatin g" or "preserving "
the gap (depending on which side of the Atlantic one resides) provides
an unfruitful, and often pernicious, direction and stru.cturing to policy.

I.

THE MEANING OF A TECHNOLOGICAL GAP

By a technologic al gap I think most people have in mind phenomena
that transcend the consequence s of differences across countries in factor

endowments, either innate, or as developed through past investment.
Thus, differences in income levels due to difference in output per worker
across countries is notI direct evidence that a technologic al gap exists

between the high and i'ower income countries.

The productivit y differences

could be the result of different amounts of resources invested, over the
years, in machinery and equipment, education, training, and other intangibles
per worker.

Various studies of cross country productivit y differences

indicate strongly that differences in investment indeed are a good part
of the story.

Both physical capital per·worker, and various measures of

education4l attainment, are systematica lly releted to-output per worker.
But various other studies indicate quite strongly that ·there is more to it
than this. *

It has been known for some time that if one looks at growth over time
within a country, increases in capi.tal per viork~r (even including education
and other forms of human capital) are incapable of fully explaining growth

*For a review and critique see Richard R. Nelson, "A Diffu~ion Hodel

of Internation al Productivit y Difference" American Economic Review, December, " :Ji.
--1969.

of productivity, and obviously can.not come to grips with the phenomena

even moire impressive than productivity growth--the tremendous enrichment

*
and improvement in the kinds of final products produced.

Recent research

by Keasing, Vernon, H~fbauer ~ and others, has been concerned with the

effect of technology an.cl technological change on trade patterns.
well-known results are that, to a considerable extent,

u.s.

**

Their

manufacturing

exports are in new products that other. countries have not yet begun to
produce in quantity.

Vernon 2.nd Hufbauer go on to show that, with a la~,

other manufacturing nations pi.ck up and emp1oy UoS, technology and
gradually cut the United States out of export markets.
By putting these threads together one comes up with an explanation

of international differences in productivity that involves but transcends
differences in capital.

The main engine of manufacturing development is

the creation of new technological knowledge 9 and its application, above
all in the United States, and to a more limited extent in Europe and Japan.
With a lag, the other major manufacturing countries pick up the new
technology and learn to use if effectively"
less developed countries do,

With a much greater lag, the

Under th:ls view" one would expect to find

differences across coentries in p:coductiv:i.t:y and composition and manufacturing
activity that transcend differenczs in capi_ta.l and other inputs per worker
directly engaged in production"

*For

a review of the literatu:r:2 See Richard R. Nelson, l1erton J. Peck,
and Edward D. Kalachek, Technologyi Economic Growth_, and Public Policy,
The Brookings Institntion 9 Washington, DoC,,, 1967.

**

Donald Keesing~ "The Imp&ct of Research and Development on U.S. Trade",
Journal of p..,litical Economy~ :Februa:::y~ 1967; Raymond Vernon, "International
Investment and Internationaf Tra.de :tn Product Cycles", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, June 1966; G.C. liu£bauer, Syn the tit~ Materials and the Theory of
International Trade.~ Ge1'ald Dtickworth :· 1966.
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A technological gap between countries~ in the above sense, should
show up in three ways.

The first is differences in general or total factor

productivity, which probably should be associated with differences in output
per worker but transcends it.

Second, one should observe that the leading

'
country is a Il,IB.jor
exporter in technically progressive industries_,

Third,

the lagging ,¢ountries should be adopters of technology rather than innovators.
It would appear probable that a technological gap, in the above sense,
does ex~st between the United States and Europe, at least in many industries.
The trade and adoption aspects of the phenomenon are, of course, well
i

docUIJ1ented.

* It is far harder to document the total factor productivity

differential.

Denison has concluded that, under his assumptions, differences

in productivity between the U.S. and Europe cannot be fully explained by
differences in capital-labor ratios, educational attainments or other
differences in relative quantities and qualities of factors of production.

**

One cannot prove the existence of a "r;ap", but it appears quite likely.

II. THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP AS A LONG-STANDING PHENGrlENON

The recent discussion of the technological gap not only asserts that
it exists, but that it is somethin~ new.

Some of the more careful

students of the phenomenon have pointed out that it isn't all that new,

*See the reference above and a series of recent articles by
Christopher Freeman and associates in the National Institute Economic
Review.
**

Edward Denison (assisted by Jean-Pierre Poullier), Why Economic Growth
Rates Differ, The Brookings Institution, 1967.

-5citing the various comparati ve productiv ity studies made just after
World War II that showed that a "gap" existed then.

But I want to

*
suggest that the phenomenon is of far longer standing than that~
As long ago as 1835 de Tocquevi lle noted reP,ardin8 shipping:
It is difficult to say for what reason the Americans can
navigate at a lower rate than other nations; one is at first
led to attribute this superiori ty to the physical advantage s
that nature given them; but it is not so ••• I am of the O?indon
that the true cause of their superiori ty must not be sought
for in physical advantage s, but that it is wholly attributa ble
to moral and intellect ual qualities.; '<*
And not just in shipping,
The United States of Americal!J. has only been emancipat ed
for half a century from the state of colonial dependenc e in
which it stood to Great Britain; the number of large fortunes
there is small and capital is still scarce. Yet no people in
the world have made such rapid progress in trade and manufac
tures as the Americans ••• ***
Habakkuk opens his excellent recent work on American and British
Technolog y in the Nineteent h Century by confirmin g and reinforcin g
de Tocquevi lle's judgment.

There is a substanti al body of comment, by English visitors
to Americani n the first half of the nineteent h century, which
suggests that, in a number of industrie s, American equipment
was, in some sense, superior to the English even at this period.
As early as 1835 Cobden had noted, in the machine shop of a
woolen mill at Lowell, "a number of machines and contrivan ces

*John Diebold also has noted this.

See his "Is the Gap Technolog ical?"

Foreign Affairs:

**Alexis

de Tocquevi lle, Democracy in America, Vintage Books, New
York, 1955, Vol. I~ p. 441.
*,~~~

Ibid., 1954, Vol. II~ pp. 165-166.

-6for abridging labour greater than at Sharp and Robers." He
thought agricultural implements in New England exhibited
"remarkable evidences of ingenuity ••• for aiding and abridging
human as well as brute labour," and gave several other instances.
And the two groups of English technicians who visited .America
in the 1850's reported that the Americans produced by more hiP,hly
mechanized and more standardised methods a wide rante of
products including doors, furniture and other wookuork; b<>Ots
and shoes; ploughs and mowin~-machine.s, wood sc rei-1s, files and
nails; biscuits, locks, clocks, small arms, nuts and bolts.*
The evidence of a technolo~ical gap in many fields prior to 1850
essentially is the record of scattered non-quantitative impressions
of so)pisticated and knowledgeable visitors.
to more quantitative evidenceo

After 1850 we have access

All three facets were present; higher total

factor productivity, a strong export position in technically progressive
industries, and foreign (European) adoption of the U.S. practices.
It is very clear that by the 1860's and 1870's real per capita
income was significantly higher in the United States than in the United
Kingdom or Hestern Europe.

Kuznet's data show that, if anything, the

percentage difference between the United States and France and Gennany
was greater in the mid-nineteenth century than today, and the relative
gap between the United States and England was only sliP,htly smaller then
than now. ** In part this was due to the high productivity of American
agriculture.

But value added per worker almost certainly uas higher in

American manufacturing industry.

*H.J. Habakkuk, .American and British Technology in the Nineteenth
Century, Cambridge University Press, 1962, pp. 4-5.
*)~

Simon Kuznets, !1ode-r::n Economic Growth, Yale University Press, 1966,
pp. 64-65.
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It was higher for at least two reasons.

Even by that time a

large number of industries in the United States probably were operating
at a higher capital-labor ratio than their English or European counter
parts.

This is both explained by and explains the significantly

higher wage rate in the

u.s.

industry.

High American wages go back at

least as far as 1830, and scattered evidence suggests that by the
1870's U.S. wages may have averaged perhaps twice that in the United
Kingdom (and even more, relative to France and Germany).
cannot be the full explanation.

But this

If it were simply greater capital intensity,

but the same total factor productivity, the rate of return on capital should
have been significantly lower in the United States. * The limited
evidence suggests, rather, that it was higher.

Over the second half of

the nineteenth century the yield on British consols never got above
3.5 percent; the yield on the best American railway bonds (to be sure
somewhat IUQre risky) never sunk that low and tended to be over 5.0 percent. **
Relatedly, .this was ~ period when capital was flowing from the United
Kingdom to the United States, not the other way around.
Between 1880 and 1910 the growth of

u.s.

finished manufactured

exports increased more than six fold; imports less than tripled.

The

United States, which ought to have and clearly did have a great comparative
advantage and large net export position in foodstuffs (which made exchange
available for manufactured imports) nonetheless ~-1as a net exporter of

*Awell known implication of economic theory is that wage rates rise,
but rates of return on capital fall, as the capital-labor ratio increases.
·if tebhnology is constant.
**William Fellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity, Henry Holt
and Company, 1956, pp. 396-397.

•
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manu factur ed produ cts by 1900.

A good share of the surge was in

"tech nical ly progr essiv e" indus tries.

By 1899 about one-t hird of t

vehic les. *
U.S. manu factur ed expor ts were in machi nery, chem icals, or
one-f ifth. The
For Germany and the Unite d Kingdom the figur e was about
en the rnid-1880 1 s
value of U.S. machi nery e,tpor ts increa sed ten-f old betwe
and 1905- 1906.

rv the
It would appea r that aroun d the turn of the centuur"

le. **
Unite d State s domin ated trade in typew riters , for examp
, not
This evide nce sugge sts a signi fican t "tech nolog ical lead"
ry was indee d
surpr ising ly, for the last half of the ninet eenth centu
the well-k nown great age of Ameri can inv~ tion.

It was also the ega

coming into
in which the system of interc hange able parts was papid ly
play in indus try afte·r indus try in the Unite d State s.

In many field s

techn ique with
Europ eans and Englis hmen were busy pickin g up Ameri can
a lag, just as today .

Of cours e, it was not a one way stree t.

The

the lead
Amer icans did not lead in all field s, and in many fields
chang ed hands .

Sometime durin g the ninet eenth centu ry the U.S. lost its

lead in shipp ing.

The Engli sh and Europ eans devel oped, and then lost

to the Amer icans, the lead in steel techn ology .

But that on the avera ge

rs in manu factur ing
in some sense , the Ameri cans were the techn ologi cal leade
indus try seems clear .

and early
data cited for U.S. expor te durin g the late ninet eenth
of the Unite d
twent ieth centu ries are from T~e Histo rical Stati stics
State s, U.S. Depar tment of Commerce, 1960.

*All

the paper by Richa rd N. Coope r, In Techn ologyd and World
Trade , U.S. Depar tment of Commerce, 1967.

**See
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',
Then, as today, there is evidence of considerabl e concern on the
part of some Europeans.

Viner presents the following qu6te from an

*
1897 letter circulated by Count Goluchowski , the Austrian Foreign Minister:
Europe has apparently reached the turning-poi nt in her
development . The solving of the great problem of the
material well-being of nations, which becomes more pres
sing from year to year, is no longer a distant Utopia.
It is near at hand. The disastrous competition which, in
all domains of human activity, we have to submit to from
over the seas, and which we will also have to encounter in
the future, must be resisted if the vital interests of
Europe are not to suffer, and if Europe is not to fall into
gradual decay. Shoulder to shoulder we must ward off the
danger that is at out doors, and in order to prepare for this
we must draw upon all the reserves that stand at out disposal.

h

••• the twentieth century will be a century of struggle f
for existence in the domain of economics. The nations of
Europe must unite in order to defend their very means of
existence. May that be understood by all, and may we make
use of those days of peaceful development to which we look
forward with confidence~ to unite our best energies.
Then, as today, some Americans were concerned about the prospects of
losing the lead for it was recognized by at least some observers that the
reason why

u.s.

industry was able to pay such high wages, still earn such

a high rate of return, and yet remain competitive in world markets, lay
in its technologic al lead.

In 1915 Tauss:ig commented as follows on the

rapid diffusion of American ·i:echnology in automatic machinery:
The more machinery becomes automatic, the more readily
be transplante d. Is there not a likelihood that apparatus
it
can
which is almost self-acting will be carried off to countries
of low wages, and there used for producing articles at lower
ptic~_ than is possible in the country of high wages where the
apparatus_h as originated? In hearings before our congression al

*From

Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, Anderson Kramer Assapiates,

1961, pp. 22-24.
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committees a fear is often expressed that American investors
and tool-makers will find themselves in such a plight. An
American firm, it is said, will devise a new machine, and
an export of the machine itself or of its products will set
in. Then some German will buy a specimen and reproduce
the machine, in his own country (the Germans have been
usually complained of as the arch plagiarists; very recently
the Japanese also are held up in terrorem). Soon not only
will the exports cease, but the machine itself will be
operated in Germany by low-paid labor, and the articles
made by its aid will be sent back to the United States.
Shoe machinery and knitting machinery have been cited in
illustration.'"
It is striking how the dialogue today echoes the earlier voices of
alarm, both European and American.
new,

This is not to argue that nothing is

Many things are, and three in;.particular would appear to be of

major importance in recent policy thinking.

First, there has been the

rise of the very large corporation to economic prominance in many industries,
the evolution of beliefs that size and technological progressivity
are closely correlated (with the causation running from size to progressivity)
and recently the phenomenon of massive direct investment in Europe by the
large American companies.

Second, there has o~curred a profound change

in the bases of military strengith with a lari:>;e and effective military R
and D effort now a pre-requisite for strategic power.

These two factors

have played an extremely important role in moldinP; the Europeans' preception
of the "technology gap", in particular in intensifying the feeling, embryonic
in the quote from Count Goluchowski, that the ~ap is a threat to national
sovereignty.

Americans also have associated ~eneral technological leadership

with military security, if not control of. economic self qestiny.

*F.W. Taussig,
. Selected Readings in International Tra d e and
Tariff froblems, Ginn & Co., Boston, 1921, po 138; reprinted from
Chapter 3 of Some Aspects of the Tariff Question, 1915.
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A third development has been the rise to prominance of large scale
organized industrial Rand D.

Only recentlyft~'Ef. organized Rand D been

recoBnized as an important factor generating technological advance.

Years

ago the focus was on "inventiveness" and"ingenuity" and "energy"; the
new focus on R and D provided a policy handle that was not there when the
sources of progressivity were viewed in terms of 1Jersonal attributes.
the 1960's data collection

Durin~

progressed to a point where 1,t Has possible

to compare national R and D efforts.

,•e

The Europeans began to point with

alarm to tha American Rand D lead, the Americans to the European closing
of the gap, and both to "doing something about it".
In the following section I shall be concerned with this last aspect-
the evolving conception of a national~ arid D policy and the influence of
"gap" thinking upon that conception.

Unfortunately inur,a.ny discussions

on both sides of the Atlantic, all three of the prominant and visible

aspects mentioned above, and the more traditional phenomena associated with
a "technology gap", are all snarled together.

,~,~

An overly simplistic

characterization of the point of view is that in todays world military and
space R and D are the key sources of almost all important tebhnological
progress, and that the efficient way to get that R and D done is through

*A useful reference is C. Freemarn' and A. Young, "The Research and
Development Effort in Western Europe, North America, and the Soviet Union,"
~ , 1965.

**As

an obvious example see J.Jc Servan Schrieber, The Americam
Challenge, Althenian Press, 1968.

-12Governmental Rand D contracts with large industrial concerns.

Suffice

it to say here that this point of view cannot be squared with evidence
that "spillover" from defense and space is impressive in only a narrow· range
11
of product fields, that it is far from clear that "size" and "efficiency

or progressivity are st~on,gly corfelated once one gets beyond some kind
of a minimal size threshhold, and, as we shall discuss later, grouing per
ception of deep troubles with the mechanism of contracted n. and D, in the

U.S. defense industries. *
In the more recent policy deliberations these aspects have been kept
more separated than earlier.

As a consequence the idea of a "civilian"

Rand D policy has emer3ed, more or less aoart from discussions of national
security policy and industrial rationalization or organization.

However,

as we shall see, there still remains certain preceived and real inter
connections.

Let us turn to this set of evolving policy ideas.

THE NEH POLICY DEPARTURE:

III.

GOVERH''.ENT SUBSIDY OF LARGE SCALE R P...ND D

ON NOH-l IILITARY PTI.ODUCTS

It now seems con,qentional wisdom that, on the one l1and, science and
technology policy is an imryortant elenent determining a nation's economic
growth perforr:iance, and on the other, that the objective of fostering
economic progress somehm11 should enter nro!'.!inantly in determininp; a nation's

. science and technoloP,y.
policies regarding

**

To a considerable

8

For a 7,eneral discussion and review of the evidence see Helson,
Peck, and Kalachek, Ibid.
t,'I,

See for exanple OEC:J D.enort, Science, EconoBic Growth, and
Government ~olic¥, Paris 1964.
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extent the suggested new policy departu1:e s really amount to doing "more"
and "better" what governmen ts have done for sol'.le time:in particula r
supportin g basic science and engineeri ng research and education .

Yet the

concept of a "gap", calling attention as it does to particula r product
fields and industrie s also naturally has pointed policy deliberat ion in
the direction of subsidizin ~ or financing the developme nt of products for
productio n and sale by private companies through the market to the general
public (prominan tly including the export public).~ This would represent
a significa nt new policy departure for the United States, as well as the
European nations.

The supersoni c transport program of the Departmen t of

Transpor tation, and the civilian power reactors programs of the Atomic
Energy Commission mark the first major steps down this road.

It is this

new direction that I want to discuss here.
Of course, for many years the Federal Government has played a vital
role in influenci ng the nation's efforts in science and technolog y, and
since the Korean War has accounted for a large share of total Rand D
spending.

However, the purposes of public.Ra nd D programs, while numecous

and diverse, can for the most part be placed in two categorie s.
is the developme nt of new technolog y for the public sector.

The first

The dominant

programs here~ of course, tradition ally have been defense related but
Governmen t also undertake s or supports Rand D to improve the ability
of public agencies to protect the public health, guard against dangerous
drugs, support construct ion of public facilitie s like airports and roads,
improve air safety, etc.

In all of these cases the Government is charged

with performin g a particula r function ai.7.d the R and D is undertake n to
permit it to perform more efficient ly"

Tbe second is to advance basic

-14~

knowledge or knowledge of highly diverse interest or use.

Here the basic

research support programs of NSF and NIH are clear examples.

Recently

NASA has been a dramatic new departure in Government sponsorship of a
scientific and technological venture that was deemed both fundamental
and of general diffuse benefit.

As Price and others have@cumenred governmental

spending for both of these purposes has traditions that go back far
into American history. *

The Constitutional responsibility for setting

and maintaining standards for weights and measures soon lead to a small
research effort in the Treasury Department.

The army arsenals performed

Rand Don a variety of weapons.COoast and Inland Surveys and explorations
were undertaken and financed to enable the Army and the Navy to protect
the country better and because it was believed that the knowledge would
be of widespread interest and utility to the citizens.
But by and large the Federal Government has steered sl;ly of supporting
and undertaking Rand D aimed specifically at improving a particular class
of products and services whose normal channel of distribution is through
the market.

Where this has been done the product in question has had

strong claim to being a merit good, the quality of which "ought" to be
improved or cost reduced (like those connected with better healtJ:;I) or
large fraction of the society was concerned with their production (as
the early rationale for public support or agricultural research) or the
product was closely linked with defense (like aviation).

There are also

*Don Price, Science and Government, New York University, 1954.
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a few examples of Rand D support innparticular industries (like coal)
bel,ieved to be "if., distress".

But by and large in all of these cases

public funds tended to go into basic and applied research, and experie
mental development, with development of commercial products being left to
private initiative and funding.
The pre·-1960 public support of research relevant to civil aviation
is directly relevant.

In 1912 the National Advisory Committee on

Aeronautics (NACA) was created to spur and facilitate the development of
American aviation.

During its heyday durin3 the 1920's and 1930's, NACA

pioneered in the development and operation of R and D facilities for general
use--for example, wind tunnels--in information collection and cli?ssemination
and in basic research and exploratory development.

It undertook major

work on aircraft streamlining, design of engine parts, properties of
fuels, structural aspects of aircraft design, building and testing a
variety of experimental hardware.

But NACA did not directly support the

development of particular commercial airplanes.
Until the 1960' s the programs of Atomic Energy Commission in support of
civilian power reactors were similar in spirit to the NACA support of
aircraft technology.

Indeed the ammended Atomic Energy Act of 1954

established a more or less explicit division of responsibility between
the AEC and private enterprise, with the Governmends role being limited
to the undertaking of support of research, the building of experimental
reactors, operating facilities for testing~ information dissemination, etc.
Private enterprise clearly was left the job of brin~ing the technology
to practice on its own initiative.

In the past decade the complexion of these two programs changed signi
ficantly.

With the advent of the SST program the Government came into the

business not just of supporting personnel, research and experimentation
in civil aviation but of sommitting itself to the development of a particular
aircraft.

Similarly the power reactor progr&71 began to plan and subsidize

Rand D through final product development.
A close look at certain charaF.teristics of the technical change process
the United States has experienced in civilian industry, and at certain
characteristics of the Government financed development programs in defense
raise some warning flags.

Technological progress in most American industries

has been marked by considerable diversity of the sources, and unpredictabilit y
(at least in fine structure) of the advances.

New products, processes,

inputs, and equipment for an industry have come from established firms in
the industry, from suppliers, purchasers, new entrants to the industry,
individual investors. * Many developments that seemed to be promising did
not pan out.

Hany importaat breakthrow~hs were relatively unpredicted and

were not supported by the recognized experts in the field.

While detailed

case studies are not plentiful, one has the impression that in most technically
progressive industries most of the bad bets were rather quickly abandoned
particularly if someone else was coming up with a better solution.

And

good ideas generally had a variety of paths to get their case heard.

*Two interesting case studies are Merton J" Peck "Inventions in the
Post War Aihuminum Industry" and John Enos "Invention and Innovation in the
Petroleum Refining Industry" both in The Rate arid Direction of Inventive
Activity, Princeton University Press, 1962.

-17In contrast, since the Korean Har the United States has attempted
to plan technological developments in defense.

A natural concomitant of

planned development financed by the Government has been a narrm,ing down
of the sources of technological advance.

The firms in the defense inddstry

have become, in effect, chosen instruments.

The likelihood is remote that

a firm without a contract could, by using its own funds, ultimately beat
out the firm ~N!li• 11 and D contract.

Thus as Goveri.1ment R and D financing

and planning has intensified independent industry initiative has dried
up.

There is no question but that the advances in performance that have

been achieved under the system arP.. fantastic.
mistakes are equally impressive.

Yet the waste and sheer

The percentage of developments that

achieved anything like the pe~for~ance originally promised at anything
near the anticipated costs ,.has, of course, been dismal.

It is not clear

that the early bets on promising desi1:,ns in defense have been any worse
than in civilian industry"

But there has been a tendency to stick with

the game plan in the face of mounting evidence that it was not a good one,
that appears only in exceptional cases }_n areas where I?. and D is more
decentralized and competitive.

The case of Convair throwing good money

after bad on the 880 development ri~htly is regarded as an abberation,
and the fact that Gene1:al Dynamics learned its stylP- in military R and D
undoubtedly was a contributing factor.

,'(

But th:Ls kind of thing is the

rule, not the exception, in military Rand D.
Why the high cost and apparent waste'!
of advance sought.

Largely because of the pace

The nature of the arms race imposes a high cost

on not

having equipment at least as good as the potential enemies', or at least
this is the perception that

£For .the Sti0ry see Richard SMi th, Corporations in Crisis, Anchor Press, 1966.
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has guided defense R and D plannine; (I will not stress here that in many
cases this notion is simply wrong).
far as it can.

Thus each P.. and D project reache_d ,as

Costs are high both because it is costly to stretch,

and because there are many stumbles,,

It would seem that ,,e ought to be

able to achieve our defense capabiEties with less cost and fewer stumbles
than we have.

But to a considerable extent the costs and stumbles seem

inherant in force feedti:ng a technology.
was much the

(Popular impressions aside there

same syndrome of cost overruns and failures in Project Apollo).

And if force feeding is felt to be important, it would seem that Governmental
subsidy and a considerable extent of central planning~ with ahosen instruments,
blocked competition, and the rest~ is the only way to do it.
Over the past decade the defense and space~ and D style has begun
to be viewed as extendible to civilian industries~ and as remarked above,
has been extended to the development of supersonic transport, and civilian
nuclear power reactors.

This has occurred both in the United States and

Europe; here I s.11.all focus largely on the U, S. experience.
the defense Rand D syndrome is emerr,ini.

In both case

Boeinp, is without competition

in SST development; with the extent of Governmental funds provided to

Boeing what other company would hazard its own funds?
emerginr, regarding production of power reactors.
these prog~ams thus far do not appear good.

A du9poly is

The batting averages in

The signals are clear enough

that the present SST design is in t~ouble (the first one had to be abandoned
after considerable expense) and only momentum and lack of an alternative
carry the project forward.

Similarly throughout the histo,ry of the power

reactor program there have been complaints that the AEC was persisting in
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Rand D onddesigns long after evidence had accumulated that this was not
an attractive route, and conversely that AEC has been sticky about
initiating work on new concepts" *
As in defense, the syndrome is largely the result of an attempt to
force feed the technologies.

The articulated reason for the force feeding

also is similar to defense-•-the objective of staying ahead of (for the
European's catching up or leapfrogging) other countries.

These programs

are the natural consequence of "technology gap" type thinking.

While there

exist some plausible arguments for some kind of Governmental assistance
to development of advanced civ:i.l aircraft: and there are quite persuasive
arguments for Governmental assistance in power reactor development, the
rate of Government funding and 9 more importantly, the extent of involvement
in final product design and development that has developed over the past

decade is justified only if American leadership, per se, is assigned very
high value.

And indeed preservation of American leadership is an explicit

objective in both programs"

-J:;':

The programs above a.re much more "technology" than science.
'But the same kind of rhetoric and rationalizetion is sneelting into
j~_tification and advocacy of science prograras.

Thus prominant among

\

the distress noises being dircctea by American science community to policy
makers and the public is thnt, es a result of c11t backs in funding of various

*For .a good

disc1.:ssion see Philip Mullenbach, Civilian Nuclear Power,
Twentieth Cen.tµry Fu".ld ~ 196 3.

s

**See

the -relevant legislation"

\\
\

\
\
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* As in
areas of science , the United States lead is being jeopard ized.
produc t field or tehcno logical areas, the "leader ship" rationa le in science
stay
policy amounts to keying policy to what other people are doing so as to
ahead of them.
I mainta in that the objecti ve of mainta ining or achievi ng across
le
the board techno logical leaders hip is not a viable one much less a desirab
guide to

u.s.

policy.

And while there may be certain fields whe-re such an

objecti ve is in the public intere st, this does not seem the case for the
SST and power reacto rs.

Simila rly across the board "leader ship" does

not seem to be a viable and certain ly is not a desirab le objecti ve for
"scienc e" policy. The broad objecti ve of mainta inin~ l'.',eneral techno logical
~d scient ific progre ssivene ss does seem viable , and probab ly does provide
a useful guide to U.S. policy .

But the kinds of policie s that seem relevan t

been
are quite differe nt from the ones we are employ ing in fields that have
infecte d by the objecti ve of preserv ing the gap.
Hainta ining across the board techno logical leaders hip is, on its
face, an arrogan t ambitio n for the United States.

Only the post World War

ary
II prostra tion of othe other major indust rial powers pennitt ed the tempor
manife station of such a phenomenon.

The United States long has lived by

being ahead on average , but except for the tempora ry post war abbera tion
d
always has been a "follow er" in many fields, and seems to have survive

all right.

With the rebirth of Western Europe and Japan, across the

board leaders hip simpiy is not a viable objecti ve.

*For

We do not have the

a sample see "The NSF Budget : House Group Reacts to Data on
the :flight of Science " Scienc e, 3 April 1970.
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anoth er count ry appea rs
resou rces to push into any techn ologi cal area where
to be pullin g ahead .

Even if we could it seeras sense less.

Surel y there

than that someo ne
are bette r crite ria for guidi ng resou rce alloc ation
else is "ahea d" or threa tens to be.
r§ ··are ·cases
It has been argue d that civil aviat ion and power reacto
stay ahead .
where we not only can but obvio usly shoul d try to
do not seem persu asive to me.

But the argum ents

Surel y there is no near tenn crisi s of con-

venti onal fuels and energ y sourc es.

*

Vario us studi es have reach ed quite

in the short and medium
sangu ine concl usion s regar ding the energ y pictu re
run.

the past
W'nile nucle ar energ y certa inly is in out future (given

there certa inly is no
fift:ee n years of AEC spend ing it is in our prese nt)
urgen cy about the matte r.

And the avail able cost bene fit studi es sugge st

the next 15 years is a
that the inten sive progra m plann ed by the AEC for
poor inves tment at this time.

Simil arly there certa inly is no press ing

mance on a bene fit
need for a SST and this is reflec ted in its pooc perfor
cost test.

**

and seque ntial
This is not to say that a slowe r paced more explo ratory
progna m would not be worth while .
but certa inly at much lower costs .

Such a progra m would yield payof f later ,
As in defE.n se it is the rush that is

Gover nment al parti cipat ion
causin g the high costs and, indid ental ly ~ requi ring
in resea rch and explo rator y
in the final produ ct develo pment stage as well as

*Even the gover nmen tal study which has need to justif y the progra m
showe d this.

See Energ LR "~D and N!1ti0 t\al...! :,1.ogr ess, USGPO, 1966.

y Comm ission
semi offic ial cost bene fit studi es are Atomi c Energ
1969,
April
am,
Progr
or
Cost Bene fit Analy sis of the U.S. Breed er React
es
Studi
mic
Econo
nt
Curre
ind Feder al Aviat ion Admi nistra tion Summary of
1969.
ber~
of the Unite d State s Super sonic Trans port~ Septem

**The
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develop ment stage.

But why rush? Is the rush justifi ed by the fear that
The British achieve d

if we don't rush someone will get there before us?

a jet transpo rt aircra ft before us, but, as the presen t Concor d, the
Comet was a premat ure aircra ft and the U.S. had no trouble catchin g up.
It is hard to believe that the long run U.S. positio n w.hil be jeopard ized
than
if we do not push through our presen t SST design , which, while better
the Concor d, certain ly is a more costly and less efficie nt aircra ft than
one we will be able to build five years from now.

That we will be in

long run trouble if a foreign power beats us out in certain reacto r designs
simply is not believa Thle.
Nation al policy makers might agree with the econom ic argume nt but
econom ic
argue that from the point of broadly defined nation al intere st, if not
well being, slippin g behind in fields like civil aviatio n and comput ers
is dangero us..
technol ogy.

This obviou sly is relevan t in fields relatin g to militar y
But there is more to it than this; as sup,~es:~~d earlie r, not

being behind techno logical ly in the most revolu tionary fields has been,
or is becomi ng, as aspect of nation al sovere ignity.

Thus many Europe ans

who do not believ e, or will not profes s, that a Europea n strateg ic
capabi lity is needed now, will argue that the option to build one is impor
tant in allianc e negoti ation, and to guard agains t a change in the world
environ ment.

Hany Europea ns who would agree that in princip le, if "rea

ft,
sonable " terms could·b e assured , it would be far cheape r to buy aircra
D,
or comput ers, from the United States than to invest vast sums in Rand
ft
will argue that having the techno logical capab:U ity to produce aircra
terms,
and comput ers given importa nt bargain ing leverag e to assure reasona ble
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and guards against future adverse developm ents.

In the United ·.states

there is a heavy element of "prestig e" on the scales.

The notion that

best civil aircraf t, or compute rs, are European or Japanese , sticks in the
throat of nationa l pride~
But given the rapid increase in technolo gical prowess of Europe and
Japan, the objectiv e of across the bo~d technolo gical leadersh ip simply
is unattain able.

Striving for such an objectiv e would be increasi ngly

costly even if it could be attained , hut it cannot.

What can be attained ,

and what makes sense to try to achieve , is general economi c, technol ogical,
and setentif ic progres siveness .

If experien ce be a guide, the road to this

objectiv e involves assuring a steady flow of well-edu cated scientis ts
and enginee rs into the labor force 1 and broad support of basic science .
Certain new depaftur es like Governm ental assistan ce of experim ental develop 
ment also would seem in order,

The incredib ly successf ul.progr ams in support

of agricul tural research , tlhe old NACA model and the earlier more related
AEC programs seem promisin g W-Gt'"~ypes.

But it would seem very importa nt

not to let the defense and recent reactor and SST abberati ons set preceden ce
and provide the model for the future.
NOii' would it seem wise for the scientif ic and educatio nal commun ities
to latch on to the "gap" argumen ts, as they appear to have in the past
year or so.

It is more likely that these a:gguments can b.e turned against

basic reserach and educatio n tha~ that these argumen ts oan sustain long
run steady support of the necessar y kin&..

Neither !\Hindsi ght" not "Traces"

nor many of the other studies of ~he relation ship between basic science
and technolo gical advance provide much support for the argumen t that a

nation's ability to advance technolo gy in the short and medium ru~ depends
much on today's basio scientif ic efforts.

They certainl y do not support

*
assertio ns of the importan ce of the scientif ic efforts of nationa ls.
Indeed so to argue cuts at the very roots of the traditio nal rationa le for
public support:

That payoffs are long run, unpredi ctable in terms of

11
specific applica tion, and difficu lt to "capture •

Argum-ents keyed tightly

to technolo gical leadersh ip are far more likely to lead to such program s
as the SST than to more support of basic research and educatio n.
extent that a nation's R and

IJ

To the

budget is viewed as a ,1hole (which seems to

be a thrust of recent "gap" thinking ) a Gresham 's law 0ay well exist that
Develop1Uent tends to drive out Research ,

A softer form of the law is that

to the extent research is justifie d by applica bility to particu lar technolo gical
fields where leadersh ip is preceive d as threaten ed, the argunen t for long
run steady support is dnowned out by inheren tly fluctuat ing and capricio us
concerns about the gap probler.1 as a whole and the nature of the threaten ed
fields.
Host certainl y this is not to argue that support of basic science
should be separate d totally frora interest in solving certain technolo gical
problems or opening up certain opportu nities.

The support of mission

oriented Government agencies (and business firms) for basic research in
fields and on topics that they regard as feedine into their technolo gical
problem -solving ability will and should continue to provi.de a major sh8Al'e
of basic research funding, and ~-,ill and should play an importan t role

*First Interim Report on Project Hil':lD?IGHT, Office of the Secretar y

of Defense , 1966; Technolo gy _in R~tr_2.spect and Critica l Events in Science ,
NSF 1968; Derek de Sola Price, The Differen ce Between Science and
Technolo gy, Address~ Dallas~ February 10, 1963.
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in dete rmin ing allo cati on acro ss field s and

But basi c rese arch

l fiel ds and prob lems must
supp ort rela ted to part icul ar tech nolo gica
the fiel d or prob lem; a ratio nale
be just ifie d by the long run impo rtanc e of
have long run cred ibil ity.
pose d in term of cris is management will not
nati on's effo rts and acco mpli shme nts
Nor am I argu ing that the qua lity of the
nati ona l prid e. But prid e
in basi c scie nce shou ld not be a matt er of
ot be perm itted to dege nera te
in nati onal acc~ mpli shme nts in scie nce cann
Russ ians or Euro peac s or Japa nese .
into a fiel d by field com paris on with the
tiea tion
Scie nce can stan d neit her the degr ee of poli

noMor the peri odic

natu ral imp licat ions . Basi c
shar p shif ts in emp hasis that woul d be the
h, base d on soli d long run expe ri
scie nce dic5r scie nce' s sake , and on the fait
the upli ft to human unde rence , that the appl ied ben efits as well as
full weig ht of the argu ment
stan ding are cons ider able , cann ot carr y the
But thes e argu men ts must carr y
for stro ng and stea dy nati ona l supp ort.
is esse ntia l that thes e trad itio nal
a cons ider able port ion of the weig ht. It
by othe rs that cann ot main tain
argu men ts not get aban done d and repl aced
long run cred ibil ity.

